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THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
AND IMPROVING ANTITRUST AGENCY
CAPACITY,
D. Daniel Sokol*
One of the key issues in international antitrust has been how to make
antitrust more effective around the world. Most antitrust laws have been
adopted or significantly modified since 1990.' A number of key jurisdic-
tions are either fairly new to antitrust altogether or to an antitrust regime
that effectively employs the latest in economic thinking and the legal tools
necessary to promote competition.2 Jurisdictions that have made antitrust a
new and important cornerstone to economic policy include Brazil, Russia,
India, and China. Because of the stakes involved in the ability of antitrust
to foster economic development and to prevent misguided antitrust policy
from operating as a regulatory tax, it is critical that the future of antitrust
focus on improving agency capacity around the world.3 By capacity, I
mean the ability of a given antitrust agency to undertake well-reasoned and
effective decisionmaking in the implementation of antitrust policy. There
are two concerns for countries in various stages of antitrust development:
harmonization of domestic antitrust with international antitrust "best prac-
tices" and implementation of an effective antitrust regime.4 In an effort to
solve these issues, policymakers in antitrust emphasize two dynamics to
shape the development of increased capacity of younger antitrust regimes.
t This Essay was previously published in the Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy on De-
cember 8, 2008, as D. Daniel Sokol, The Future of International Antitrust and Improving Antitrust
Agency Capacity, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 242 (2008), http://www.law.northwestem.edu/
lawreview/colloquy/2008/46/.
. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I would like to thank Stu
Cohn for his comments on law and development.
I See Global Competition Forum Homepage, http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org (last visited
Mar. 13, 2009).
2 To provide some historic perspective on how significant a change this is, William Kovacic notes,
"In 1979, nobody envisioned that competition policy would be a concern beyond a relatively small
number of countries with well established market economies." Interview by Stephanie Yon with Wil-
liam Kovacic, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, A new Chairman for the FTC, CONCURRENCES, Mar.
2008, at 5, 6.
3 Eleanor M. Fox, Economic Development, Poverty, and Antitrust: The Other Path, 13 Sw. J.L. &
TRADE AM. 211 (2007) (articulating a link between antitrust and economic development).
4 There is variation in how one defines antitrust "effectiveness." See, e.g., INT'L COMPETITION
NETWORK, AGENCY EFFECTIVENESS PROJECT (2008).
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The first is international antitrust institutions, such as the International
Competition Network, that develop antitrust norms.5 The other is technical
assistance, either from these international antitrust institutions or directly
from more developed antitrust agencies or other aid providers. By technical
assistance, I mean the process through which agencies improve their capac-
ity to undertake competition policy.
This Essay focuses on how both external-international institutions-
and internal-agency capacity and technical assistance--dynamics shape
the capacity of younger agencies to undertake antitrust in their jurisdictions.
Both approaches play an important role in improving capacity. In the case
of technical assistance, this Essay analyzes survey data from recipient agen-
cies of antitrust technical assistance to determine the most effective means
of improving antitrust agency capacity. Part I explains the type of capacity
building that antitrust agencies undertake themselves. The rest of this Es-
say focuses upon international efforts that can assist agencies in capacity
building. Part II describes the work that international antitrust institutions
undertake to improve agency capacity. Part III provides an analysis of sur-
vey data that shows how technical assistance from outside providers can
improve agency capacity. Part IV concludes and offers recommendations
to improve developing world antitrust agency capacity building.
I. AGENCY LEVEL CAPACITY BUILDING
As young agencies face significant capacity constraints, they require
assistance in how to use their scarce resources as effectively as possible to
improve their ability to combat anticompetitive conduct. Though interna-
tional antitrust institutions play a significant role in improving the capacity
of newer antitrust agencies, capacity building ultimately is a local experi-
ence, and in-country dynamics play a critical role in shaping the contours of
antitrust policy and enforcement. A number of factors impact the ability of
an agency to be effective. These include the legal structure of antitrust law
in its country, the human resources within the agency, and the agency's ca-
pacities within a larger country-wide regulatory system, such as the judici-
ary, sector regulators, and the legislature. Factors also include the level of
independence of the agency from political interference, the level of investi-
gatory authority provided under the law, and the funding to the agency.
Antitrust agencies may not have the skill set and internal capacity to
take on certain types of work.6 There is a learning curve for young antitrust
agencies. In some cases, new agencies only start their learning curve after
5 By institution, I limit myself to formal institutions devoted to antitrust, such as the International
Competition Network (ICN) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD).
6 Michael W. Nicholson, D. Daniel Sokol & Kyle W. Stiegert, Technical Assistance for Law &
Economics: An Empirical Analysis in Antitrust/Competition Policy (Univ. of Wis. Legal Studies Re-
search Paper Series, Paper No. 1025, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-917909.
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they have been set up, as agency staff may not understand antitrust law and
its application before then.7 There are two elements to the learning curve.
The first is the environment of the institution (rules of the game). The sec-
ond is institutional governance (play of the game).8 For an antitrust agency,
the "rules" stage includes the conceptualization and creation of the antitrust
agency and its institutional structure. It also includes drafting the antitrust
law and ensuring that its provisions import the latest economic thinking
with application to the specific political and economic dynamics of a coun-
try and rules of the game that allow an agency to combat anticompetitive
conduct.
"Play" issues present themselves once an agency has become estab-
lished and resources shift to more active antitrust enforcement. These play
issues require the institutionalization of antitrust by embedding it into a
country's legal structure and creating antitrust enforcement norms for the
agency.' Antitrust is evolutionary.'" This suggests that agencies will con-
front different variations of problems over time. The evolution happens at a
number of levels-shifts in government policies, economic thinking, and
judicial interpretation. These issues impact the ability of agencies to fight
against anticompetitive conduct given changing political-economy dynam-
ics within a country.
The cost of the allocation of scarce resources toward enforcement vis-
At-vis the payoff is likely to differ across countries and regions. Detection
and litigation costs are not the same in every jurisdiction. Cases are, to a
certain extent, situation specific, and the ability to take on work in merger
control, cartel enforcement, competition advocacy, or unilateral conduct
changes in response to technical advances, political shifts, and economic
growth. Agencies may be limited in what they can do based on the limits of
their antitrust law or larger legal system." Moreover, in countries with pri-
vate rights of action, an agency may not need to spend as many resources
against certain types of anticompetitive conduct because private litigants
may substitute for the antitrust agency.
7 Michael Krakowski, Competition Policy Works: The Effect of Competition Policy on the Intensity
of Competition-An International Cross-Country Comparison 4 (HWWA Discussion Paper, Paper No.
332, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-854908.
8 Oliver E. Williamson, Why Law, Economics, and Organization?, 1 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 369,
385 (2005)
9 William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition
Economies, 23 BROOK J. INT'L L. 403 (1997).
10 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION (2005).
11 Keith N. Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of
Competition Laws and Their Effects, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 271 (2007) (providing the makeup of antitrust
laws across legal systems).
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II. INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST INSTITUTIONS
CAPACITY BUILDING
One international governance mechanism to improve the capacity of
antitrust agencies comes in the form of "soft law" institutions, which are
based on nonbinding norms. 2 International antitrust soft law institutions
focus on cooperation to ensure international harmonization and the creation
of antitrust norms. 3 These soft law institutions identify best practices from
around the world, create norms, and push the diffusion of such norms, such
as greater transparency and predictability in mergers. Over time, through
increased iterations of meetings and interactions, agencies develop a level
of trust and relationship capital with one another. " The network of agency
level cooperation becomes strengthened through this trust. 5 Trust in turn
creates opportunities for increased cooperation among agencies. 6 This
process creates opportunities for younger antitrust agencies to adopt best
practices in a setting that allows for integration of the norms into the local
political and economic realities of a given country.
Three soft law international antitrust institutions provide support to en-
courage harmonization based on the creation and diffusion of antitrust best
practices. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) 7 addresses antitrust issues primarily through its Competition Law
and Policy Committee. A second international antitrust institution is the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). s
UNCTAD serves as the UN-sponsored voice for the developing world.
Like the OECD, it organizes conferences, peer reviews, technical assistance
missions, and reports. However, UNCTAD is more limited in its impact as
some of its viewpoints differ from those of the international antitrust institu-
tions in which more developed countries shape the antitrust agenda. The
12 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L
ORG. 421, 434 (2000) (describing a far more nuanced set of factors that go into what constitutes soft law
than word limits permit for this Essay); D. Daniel Sokol, Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Coun-
tries Enter into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements, 83 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 231, 242 (2008) (arguing hard law antitrust implicates the WTO and other trade agree-
ments).
13 D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International Anti-
trust in a Global GildedAge, 4 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 37 (2007).
14 Partha Dasgupta, Trust as a Commodity, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE
RELATIONS 49 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988); Werner Guth, Peter Ockenfels & Markus Wendel, Coopera-
tion Based on Trust: An Experimental Investigation, 18 J. ECON. PSYCH. 15 (1997); Larry E. Ribstein,
Law vs. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 569-70 (2001).
15 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality-The Viability of the Network
Concept, 3 EURO L.J. 33 (1997).
16 Ernst Fehr & Simon Gichter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J.
ECON. PERSP. 159 (2000).
17 See Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Competition,
http://www.oecd.org/competition (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
18 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Competition Law and Policy,
http://www.unctad.org/competition (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
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third international antitrust institution is the International Competition Net-
work (ICN).'9 The ICN's purpose is to identify, create, and spread antitrust
norms and results-driven outputs to reduce the costs that make enforcement
against anticompetitive conduct more difficult. One effect of ICN-
promulgated nonbinding recommended practices has been their adoption by
many antitrust agencies."0
One mechanism to diffuse norms through international antitrust institu-
tions is the process of peer review. A peer review is a diagnostic (pioneered
by the OECD) that measures the strengths and weaknesses of a country's
antitrust system.2' Peer reviews cover a number of issues. After describing
the background of a country's antitrust system, the peer review engages in a
critical analysis of substantive issues such as merger control, cartels, and
monopolization. A second element of the review is to analyze the institu-
tional setting of antitrust in a given country. This includes the enforcement
structure, resources, and practices of the agency, the role of the judiciary,
and the impact of international issues. After an analysis of substantive and
institutional issues, the peer review provides conclusions and policy op-
tions. In a formal meeting along with other countries' antitrust agency rep-
resentatives present, the reviewed agency responds to the peer review.
Then other agencies comment upon the peer review.22 This process allows
agencies to offer constructive criticism of policies to one another. Bad
policies may be subject to shaming of an agency by its peers. Through this
mechanism, peer reviews can help to create compliance with best prac-
tices.23
Another mechanism that increases antitrust agency capacity is the use
of reports that survey members about their practices. Reports allow agen-
cies to take stock of their practices relative to other agencies. Agencies
learn from the experiences and approaches of other agencies in the sum-
mary of jurisdictional practices or a series of case studies. Some recent ex-
amples of such reports discuss how agencies address issues of predatory
pricing24 or how agencies confront dominant firms.2 5
19 See International Competition Network Home Page, http://www.
internationalcompetitionnetwork.org (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
20 j. William Rowley & A. Neil Campbell, Implementation of the ICN's Recommended Merger
Practices: A Work-in-(Early)-Progress, ANTITRUST SOURCE, July 2005, at 1-2. The size of the ICN,
with roughly one hundred member antitrust agencies and additional participation from nongovernmental
participants seems small enough that reputation-based enforcement mechanisms work.
21 FABRIZIO PAGANI, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PEER REVIEW: A TOOL FOR CO-
OPERATION AND CHANGE: AN ANALYSIS OF AN OECD WORKING METHOD 4 (2002) (peer review is the
assessment of a state by other states designed to improve policymaking).
22 Id. (peer review is characterized by dialogue and interactivity, and contains a consultation phase).
23 The OECD recommended a change to Brazilian merger control in 2005 based on international
practices. A current bill before Brazil's Congress seeks to implement such changes.
24 See generally INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, REPORT ON PREDATORY PRICING (2007).
25 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION ON THE MERITS (2005) (describing the
different theories to prevent abuse of dominance).
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Aiding in the creation of improved capacity, the ICN tailors a number
of its work products to younger antitrust agencies. These include the crea-
tion of enforcement manuals, reports on how jurisdictions address various
types of conduct, workshops to improve investigation techniques and ana-
lytical approaches, and meetings of enforcers and nongovernmental advi-
sors to discuss report findings and agency priorities. 6 These outputs
provide an opportunity to share ideas and enforcement experiences. For
young agencies, the ICN also organizes regular meetings in which agency
members from around the world meet via conference call on a regular basis
to discuss how best to utilize analytical tools for cases and policy work.
The ICN also spends considerable time and resources on conceptualizing
agency priorities, which the OECD and UNCTAD do as well.
How effective are these international institutions? It is difficult to de-
termine measures of success generally based on whether this was the best
way to spend time and resources. Anecdotally, such international efforts
seem to be improving the capacity of younger agencies.27 Soft law is most
effective at reducing costs when the costs stem from information and coor-
dination costs. 8 For example, antitrust soft law institutions have become
increasingly effective in reducing the costs associated with merger review
and cartel enforcement.29 The reason for this is simple: international merger
control and international cartel enforcement require coordination, such as
how much time to approve a merger or to ensure that the law provides ade-
quate investigative powers against cartels. There is no serious disagreement
as to the pernicious effects of cartels or the fact that multiple and overlap-
ping merger control systems create increased compliance costs around the
world. Nor is there disagreement that the merger regimes of younger agen-
cies should not create unduly burdensome restrictions when there are not
competitive concerns or merger regimes that lack transparency and expedi-
ency.
In substantive areas of law, antitrust soft law institutions may have dif-
ficulty implementing best practices where there is disagreement over ana-
lytical approaches, particularly between the United States and the EU. For
example, compare the U.S. and EU responses to Microsoft litigations on
single-firm conduct.3" These tensions over differing analytical frameworks
26 Sokol, supra note 13, at 109-15 (describing the ICN's attempts to promote cooperation and har-
monization among antitrust jurisdictions via benchmarking and working group issue study).
27 Cf INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, supra note 4 (evaluating the efficacy of twenty national and
international regulatory and advisory bodies).
28 Causation may go the other way. Where agencies cannot reach agreement on binding rules, we
are more likely to see soft law as a result.
29 Sokol, supra note 13, at 112-15.
30 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH
TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 2 (2007) (providing a detailed analysis of the U.S. response);
Daniel Spulber, Competition Policy and the Incentive to Innovate: The Dynamic Effects of Microsoft v.
Commission, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 247 (2008) (describing the European approach in Microsoft v. Com-
mission).
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have significant potential repercussions. Without the active support of the
major powers in antitrust-the EU and United States-the efforts of the in-
ternational antitrust institutions will be severely limited in their ability to
create and promote increased capacity building around the world. Should
the EU and United States not put their resources and efforts into soft law in-
stitutions, the lack of their participation would compromise the effective-
ness of any antitrust soft law institution.
III. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CAPACITY BUILDING
Apart from agency level building and international institutions, another
form of capacity building is more formalized and occurs through technical
assistance to newer antitrust agencies. Unlike general norm diffusion, tech-
nical assistance directly targets specific antitrust agencies and the overall
competition system of a given jurisdiction. Technical assistance is the
process through which donors provide assistance to recipients for direct dif-
fusion of knowledge and skills. In the antitrust context, technical assistance
allows for agencies to build their skills in identifying potential anticompeti-
tive conduct; combating it through cases, filings, and legislative means; and
reaching out to government and nongovernment stakeholders in the larger
antitrust system. Technical assistance also entails providing advice on how
to prioritize agency goals, how to manage an effective antitrust agency, and
how to make competition policy relevant outside of the agency.
For the most part, the antitrust policy and academic communities re-
main in the dark about what makes for effective antitrust technical assis-
tance. The Antitrust Modernization Commission's 2007 Report recom-
mended that Congress directly fund antitrust technical assistance through
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
rather than indirectly through USAID. This recommendation was made
without any guidance from empirical work on the effectiveness of
DOJ/FTC technical assistance or the effectiveness more generally of anti-
trust technical assistance. In 2008, panelists at a joint DOJ/FTC workshop
on antitrust technical assistance focused as much on identifying ineffective
strategies as identifying effective ones.3" Similarly, capacity building has
been the topic of meetings at international antitrust institutions.33
31 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 219 (2007) ("The com-
mission believes that providing funding ... directly to the antitrust agencies will help to ensure that the
objectives and priorities of antitrust technical assistance are properly weighed.").
32 U.S. Dep't of Justice, 2008 International Technical Assistance Workshop: Charting the Future
Course of International Technical Assistance at the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission (Feb. 6, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/techassist2008/
236894.pdf.
33 See, e.g., INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, ASSESSING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE: PRELIMINARY
RESULTS 1 (2005) ("Capacity building is the major challenge facing developing competition authorities
today."); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION ASSESSMENT TOOLKIT (2007) (de-
scribing ways to increase competition).
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Previous empirical work on antitrust technical assistance has identified
that short term interventions (STIs) and long term advisors (LTAs) play a
role in more effective technical assistance. 4 LTAs are long term in the
sense that they spend an extended amount of time (such as a year) working
in the recipient county's antitrust agency-for example, an FTC economist
who spends a year residing in Mexico's antitrust agency. In contrast, an
STI is an intervention that addresses a discrete issue or task, such as how to
bring a successful merger challenge in the banking sector or how to gather
evidence against cartels, which a DOJ antitrust attorney might do in a one-
week session for Indonesia's antitrust agency.
In a survey undertaken in 2004 for technical assistance from 1996 to
2003, the ICN gave member agencies who had received technical assistance
a 1,000-plus-question questionnaire about their experiences.35 Below, I pro-
vide a descriptive analysis of the survey data, which is distinct from the
formal modeling that Professor Stiegert and I undertook in another paper.36
There are a number of theoretical observations and new evidence from the
ICN data that provide further guidance on the most effective way to utilize
LTAs and STIs.
Any critique of antitrust technical assistance must address the funda-
mental issue that scholars and policy makers often ignore: do technical as-
sistance interventions choose the appropriate expert for the technical
assistance?37 It may be that experts lack sufficient competence to provide
technical assistance. The wrong people may be chosen for the STI and
LTA missions. A shortcoming of advisors with limited specific antitrust
knowledge (or relatively weak knowledge of antitrust based on only a few
years of practice in this area) is that such advisors may not themselves have
the appropriate level of knowledge to provide assistance to young antitrust
agencies.
The quality mismatch may be a function of supply-side issues. Some
technical assistance may be in countries or regions that high-quality advi-
sors are not willing to travel to or reside in for any number of reasons. If
the donor chooses an advisor who is not a member of a current antitrust
agency, this may open up technical assistance to full-time consultants.
Some may have limited experience specific to antitrust, even though they
34 Nicholson, Sokol & Stiegert, supra note 6.
35 The survey instruments can be reviewed at Int'l Competition Network, Document Library for the
Competition Policy Implementation Working Group, http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/
index.php/en/library/working-group/16 (last visited Mar. 13, 2009). Among forty-nine agencies sur-
veyed, seventeen agencies had an LTA while twenty-nine agencies had an STI.
36 See D. Daniel Sokol & Kyle W. Stiegert, An Empirical Evaluation of Long Term Advisors and
Short Term Interventions in Technical Assistance and Capacity Building (Univ. of Mo. Sch. Of Law Le-
gal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2008-03, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract- 1095884.
37 Nicholson, Sokol & Stiegert, supra note 6 (finding that technical assistance is more effective
when both donor and recipient are actively involved in its planning).
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may be experienced in regulated industries more generally or in public ad-
ministration. These consultants may tend to be relatively weak in their un-
derstanding of antitrust and may yield poor results in the quality of their
technical assistance intervention.
A. Who Provides Technical Assistance?
I examined the make-up of technical assistance advisors to get a sense
of whether or not they are the most effective for the type of work at hand.
Figures 1 and 2 identify the educational backgrounds of LTA and STI advi-
sors respectively. LTAs and STIs have similar educational backgrounds.
The highest percentage of LTAs and STIs have law backgrounds (53.85
percent and 44.44 percent for LTAs and STIs respectively) followed by
economics (23.08 percent and 33.33 percent for LTAs and STIs respec-
tively). Next are advisors with joint law and economics degrees (15.38 per-
cent and 9.26 percent for LTAs and STIs respectively). The educational
backgrounds of the remainder of advisors were unknown.
Figure I: Educational Background of LTA
Don't Know
Both Lawand Econmics
15% r4
23o%
Figure 1: Educational Background of LTA Advisors
Figure 2: Educational Background of STI
Other Unknown
Both Law and 4%
Economics
9% ~
Figure 2: Educational Background of STI Advisors
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From these findings, what remains unclear is what percentage of law-
yers and economists had a background in competition law or competition
economics. I get the answer to this indirectly by examining the origins of
the LTA and STI advisors. Of LTAs, 71 percent came to the recipient
agency from competition agencies. Of the remainder, 14 percent came
from law school faculties, 7 percent came from economics departments or
business school faculties, and 7 percent came from private firms. The
breakdown looked a bit different in terms of STIs, which may account for
why STIs seem to be less effective. A smaller percentage of STI advisors
came from competition agencies (62 percent). The next highest number of
STIs originated in law school faculties (14 percent), followed by economics
departments or business school faculties (9 percent), multination lender or
multinational organizations (6 percent), private firms (6 percent), and not
available (3 percent)."
B. Evaluation of Technical Assistance
In general, agencies were more satisfied with LTAs than STIs. How-
ever, when the advisor had a law background, agencies were more satisfied
with STIs than LTAs. Conversely, when the advisor had an economic
background, agencies were more satisfied with LTAs than STIs. Recipient
agencies were more satisfied with LTA than STI providers who had a back-
ground in economics. Why might this be the case? Many discrete legal is-
sues where attorneys are selected for which advice can be given are hands
on and lend themselves to short interventions, such as how to bring a case,
how to gather evidence, or how to depose a witness. Economics might be
more difficult to absorb in a short period of time. A one-week course on
the use of econometric techniques may not be easy to absorb for an agency
in which perhaps only one economist has an advanced degree in economics
and all other agency economists have no training beyond a bachelor's de-
gree.
I evaluated the accomplishments of technical assistance via responses
to questions concerning how satisfied agencies were with their technical as-
sistance experience. To simplify, I concentrated my analysis on three over-
all evaluations on both the LTA and STI survey: (a) the overall quality of
the LTA/STI component, (b) the overall quality of the advisors themselves,
and (c) the overall impact of the LTA/STI component on the effectiveness
of the agency at fulfilling its mission or objectives. Agencies answered the
questions by using a scale of 1 (very dissatisfied) to 7 (very satisfied). I
calculated the averages of each response and classified all evaluations by
the educational background of the LTA/STI advisor.
1090
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Figure 3: The Average of the Overall Evaluations of Technical
Assistance Providers (Law)
The ocerall quaity ofthe
LTA/ST1 component
The 05,r11 quality of the i eLTA
adm~ors themselves is-
The overall impact of the
LTA/ST component of
Technical Assistance
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Figure 3: The Average of the Overall Evaluations of Technical
Assistance Providers (Law)
Figure 3 shows that for LTA and STI providers whose educational
background is law, agencies are more satisfied with STI than LTA interven-
tions in the overall quality of the component and advisors. In contrast, the
overall impact concerning the effectiveness of the agency at fulfilling its
mission or objectives shows a higher LTA evaluation than STI.
Figure 4: The Average of the Overall Evaluations of Technical
Assistance Providers (Economics)
The oeall quality of
the LTA/STI
component
The -cal qality of
the adcAsors
theo.0o
The ocemil impact of
the LTAISli
component of
Technical Assistance
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Figure 4: The Average of the Overall Evaluations of Technical
Assistance Providers (Economics)
Figure 4 illustrates that recipient agencies are more satisfied with LTA
than STI providers who have a background in economics. Scores overall
were higher for economists than for lawyers, but much of this difference
1091
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was based upon stronger scores among economist LTAs relative to lawyer
LTAs.
39
C. What Kind of Technical Assistance?
Figure 5 shows the types of anticompetitive practices that technical as-
sistance sought to overcome: cartel agreements, non-cartel horizontal
agreements, vertical agreements, and abuse of dominance/monopolization.
Excluding unavailable responses, abuse of dominance has the highest per-
centage of technical assistance intervention at 31 percent. The next highest
was vertical agreements at 25 percent, with cartel agreements and non-
cartel horizontal agreements at 22 percent each.
Figure 5: Types of Cases
Noncartel honizontal
asnements
Abuse of dominance~31%
%Vertical Agreemens
25%
Figure 5: Types of Cases
Though not shown graphically, types of cases can be broken down into
both LTA and STI components. In the case of LTA interventions, the
breakdown for types of cases was abuse of dominance at 40 percent fol-
lowed by the remaining three types of cases evenly split at 20 percent each.
In the case of STI interventions, abuse of dominance made up 44 percent of
the cases, vertical and non-cartel vertical agreements each made up 22 per-
cent of the cases, and cartel agreements made up the remaining 11 percent
of cases undertaken. These breakdowns suggest that technical assistance
reaches broadly in many different substantive areas of antitrust and that re-
gardless of what agency enforcement priorities should be, young agencies
confront many types of conduct challenges immediately.
1092
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D. Is Some Technical Assistance Better than Others?
My hypothesis is that LTAs would be viewed as more effective than
STIs. As a theoretical matter, where there is a staff that does not have high
levels of knowledge and experience in certain tasks, an LTA can overcome
the knowledge gap and jump start the types of work that an agency might
otherwise not be able to undertake.4" Because an LTA is embedded within
an agency, an LTA may respond rapidly to local changes because it has
more flexibility.4' An STI, in contrast, may require months of planning so
that by the time it arrives, there is another issue that has developed that is of
a higher priority that needs immediate attention, which the STI cannot pro-
vide.
Because an LTA has the ability to contextualize an agency's needs and
priorities rather than being confined to a discrete task, the LTA may call in
the right STIs for specific needs of an agency. For example, a recent FTC
LTA called in a short term advisor to provide training on the economics of
price squeezes in regulated industries. A second advantage of LTAs is that
they have the flexibility to wrap themselves around problems as they arise.
In contrast, short-term missions may not provide an adequate amount of
time to make significant progress on an issue. Moreover, should an issue
take an unexpected twist, an LTA need not constantly seek approval to fo-
cus on different tasks and when to request additional assistance in the form
of STIs. Finally, because of longer tenure at an antitrust agency, an LTA
advisor will gain a greater opportunity to develop trust and credibility with
the agency than an STI advisor would. 2
On the other hand, STIs might be more successful for several reasons.
Some interventions need not be long term. There may be discrete tasks that
can be undertaken in just a few days for which a short term intervention is
more appropriate. STIs may be effective in situations in which the donor
and recipient are in agreement as to the appropriate assessment of the
agency-its strengths and weaknesses. An STI can serve a diagnostic pur-
pose to gauge the skills and temperament of the agency staff and leadership.
40 William E. Kovacic, Antitrust and Competition Policy in Transition Economies: A Preliminary
Assessment, in 1999 ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 513, 537
(Barry Hawk ed., 2000) ("The best assistance programs are anchored by the presence of long-term advi-
sors who reside in-country and work directly with the host country's policy officials.").
41 Of course, the degree to which an LTA is embedded varies greatly based on the receptiveness of
the recipient agency.
42 There are some caveats. LTAs may focus on donor goals rather than recipient agency goals, if
the two are not the same. This could create a disconnect between the LTA and the recipient agency. For
example, goals may diverge when the recipient of antitrust technical assistance begins to investigate a
firm from the donor's country. Does the technical assistance relationship lead to effective monitoring by
the donor of the LTA or STI? What incentives does accountability (or lack thereof) create? In an effort
to reduce the agency problem, donors may focus on efforts with more project-related tangible gains (for
example, more cases rather than fewer but better cases). I did not have an effective way of measuring
these concerns.
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Alternatively, an STI may highlight the need and create legitimacy for a
better push for an LTA. STIs tend to be effective when there is a well-
defined problem that requires specialized skills. For example, a competi-
tion agency analyzing its first merger in the banking industry might benefit
from an STI that includes a merger specialist in the banking sector. The
most effective STIs will be those that build technical skills and capacity in
an agency on discrete issues, and thus have less need to understand the gen-
eral political and economic context surrounding the agency. STIs that
might be particularly effective may be those that address issues of investi-
gative techniques rather than ones of strategic issues, such as which priori-
ties to pursue.
The relative weakness may be that STIs may provide general policy
prescriptions that are not localized to deal with the specifics of the agency
and its political economy.43 This includes assumptions about the scope of
antitrust legislation, the role of the judiciary, and the context for obtaining
nonagency approval to undertake enforcement. In countries where there is
significant corruption within the government, the need to request approval
from other parts of government to undertake enforcement serves as a way of
rent-seeking for corrupt officials, so classroom truths would be of limited
use.
An additional problem for STIs that may lead to lower scores is the po-
tential lack of an opportunity to provide follow-up assistance. This may
have led to general confusion on the part of the recipient agency as to
whether and how to implement the advice of the STI. Similarly, slow reac-
tion time may be an issue. By the time donors launch an STI intervention-
weeks or months later-the issue may no longer be relevant.
Based on these assumptions, one hypothesis is that LTAs could allow
the recipient agencies to take on more kinds of work than STIs due to
greater integration with the recipient and a better understanding of its needs.
On the general effectiveness of LTAs and STIs, I examined the answers to
following question: Has the agency undertaken enforcement cases after the
beginning of this project that it could not have undertaken without the tech-
nical assistance received during the project?
In the case of LTAs, Figure 6 illustrates that 47 percent of respondents
answered "yes," that the presence of the LTA had assisted recipient agen-
cies to undertake work that they could not have undertaken previously. An
additional 47 percent answered "no," while 6 percent did not respond to the
question.
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EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIMENTS (Jonathan Zeitlin & David Trubek eds., 2003).
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Figure 6: New Types of Enforcement Due to LTAs
N A
Figure 6: New Types of Enforcement Due to LTAs
In the case of STIs, Figure 7 illustrates that only 14 percent of techni-
cal assistance recipients found that the STI allowed them to take on new
cases that they could not have undertaken previously. In contrast, 83 per-
cent answered that STI intervention was ineffective in that it did not allow
agencies to take on new kinds of cases. These findings support the hy-
pothesis that LTAs may be more effective in creating increased new capac-
ity for young antitrust agencies.
Figure 7: New Types of Enforcement Due to STIs
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Figure 7: New Types of Enforcement Due to STIs
STIs may not be as effective because an agency may not express its
needs for STIs very well. Consequently, the wrong experts may be sent
over or an intervention may spend too much or too little time on certain is-
sues. For example, an agency may identify what it believes to be an exclu-
sive dealing issue, whereas after the first day of a three-day mission, an
advisor may discover that the underlying problem for the agency is actually
a predatory pricing issue. This leads to an ineffective use of presentation
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time, whereas LTAs have more time to perform a diagnostic to determine
the actual needs of an agency.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
With respect to international institutions and soft law norms spreading,
this Essay demonstrates that international antitrust institutions play an im-
portant role in improving agency capacity. With respect to technical assis-
tance, descriptive analysis of the survey was in line with my hypothesis that
LTAs would be more effective than STIs in undertaking new work. The
reasons for this are that LTAs had longer to understand the true economic
situation in the country, the larger political context, and a sense of the
strengths and weaknesses of the agency and supporting institutions of the
country's antitrust system. Another finding is that economists and lawyers
seemed to be more effective in some settings than others. Not only does
this analysis have relevance for future international antitrust efforts, my
analysis may prove relevant to policies of how to make assistance more ef-
fective across other regulatory fields. It shows the need for understanding
the political and economic contexts of agencies and their countries, as well
as creating efforts that have the flexibility to respond to problems as they
arise and the need to choose experts appropriate for the problem, in creating
effective aid. Because these results are based on a small number of re-
sponses, we should be cautious in drawing conclusions from them. Never-
theless, this initial analysis leads to a number of recommendations:
" More LTAs. More resources should be put into LTAs provided by
developed-world antitrust agency staff.
" Increased coordination between donors and recipients of technical as-
sistance. Technical assistance will be more effective when the re-
quirements for such assistance are better understood by both donor and
recipient.
" Increased norm creation on coordination issues. Improved coordina-
tion across agencies has proven to be incredibly effective as a way to
transmit antitrust norms and improve capacity. Working on the nuts
and bolts of everyday coordination and cooperation across different
antitrust issues can improve the effectiveness of younger agencies.
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